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SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
PARADOX OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
Nan D. Hunter*

In Lawrence v. Texas,1 the Supreme Court performed a double
move, creating a dramatic discursive moment: it both decriminalized
consensual homosexual relations between adults, and, simultaneously,
authorized a new regime of heightened regulation of homosexuality.
How that happened and what we can expect next are the subjects of
this essay.
The obvious point of departure for an analysis of Lawrence is its
decriminalization of much sexual conduct. Justice Scalia began this
project with his dire warning that "[s]tate laws against bigamy, same
sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are . . . sustainable only in light of
Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices."2 Justice Scalia
correctly predicts that laws against fornication are now a dead letter;3
there are no laws against masturbation, so his worries there are
unnecessary.4 But the judicial processes for evaluating laws prohibiting
other sexual conduct will constitute one major segment of the overall
process that will construct the next chapter of sexuality law.
Sodomy law operated as both a mechanism of subordination and a
metaphor of heterosexual superiority.5 Decriminalization is not
deregulation, however. Nor is it a marker of full equality. Rather, it is
one stage in a regulatory process, one likely to produce even more
"institutional incitement to speak about [sex], and to do so more and
more; a determination on the part of the agencies of power to hear it
spoken about, and to cause it to speak through explicit articulation

*
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., Northwestern University; J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center. I appreciate the research assistance of Robin
Fukuyama and Emily Kern, editorial suggestions by Anne Kanyusik of the Michigan Law
Review, and the support of Brooklyn Law School's program of summer research stipends.

1. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
2. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 10-13.
4. Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage, SUP. Cf. REV. (forthcoming 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=450160 (Sept. 2003).
5. For an extensive analysis of the direct and indirect effects of sodomy law, see
Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy
Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000).
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and endlessly accumulated detail."6 State involvement with sexuality
has not ended, and Lawrence poses an implicit question: How will the
discursive policing of homosexuality change in the wake of this
decision? 7
Legal disputes will likely center on the extent to which the indirect
mechanisms operating in fields such as family and employment law
will supplant criminal law in state regulation of homosexuality.
Lawrence deprives the government of easy invocations of morals or
tradition to justify regulation. Courts will have to engage in more
particularized assessments of whether legitimate state interests justify
classifications based on sexual orientation: judges will have to hear
homosexuality spoken about even more frequently, and, in order to do
their jobs, will have to cause it to speak.
The threshold question in such inquiries will be determining the
correct standard of review. Courts may be reluctant to test sexual
orientation classifications by the same stringent criteria that they apply
under the upper tiers of Equal Protection review, but the extreme
deference of old-fashioned rational basis review has now been
complicated by the Court's recognition that at least some adverse
treatment of gay people is invidious and disfavored. Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion suggests that there are two tiers of
rational basis review as well, something the Court intimated but did
not make explicit in Romer v. Evans.8
Whatever standard of review the courts apply, the inquiries into
the reasonableness of differentiating based on sexual orientation will
become more detailed and contextual. This aspect of "heightened
scrutiny" reflects the fact that juridical discourse on sexuality always
has two focuses: examination of the legitimacy of governmental
actions and, often sub silentio, examination of the social acceptability
of those persons who are the objects of the government's
interventions. I use the phrase "heightened scrutiny" here to refer not
to the standard hierarchy of levels of review under the Equal
Protection Clause, but to surface this second, implicit meaning of the
phrase. The paradox of this form of heightened scrutiny is that such

6. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT,
Vintage Books 1990) (1976).

THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY

18 (Robert Hurley trans.,

7. Throughout this article, I refer solely to gay and lesbian persons, not to other sexual
minorities, because homosexuality was the focus of the Court's opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas. I expect, and hope, that transgendered people will also be able to invoke the Court's
recognition that the government should not demean and disrespect its citizens based on
harmless varieties of sexual self-representation. But a full explication of that set of issues is
beyond the scope of this Article.
8. 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342
F.3d 752, 768 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., dissenting) (" '[R]ationality' in the law of equal
protection is not in fact a single standard, though the courts have been coy about admitting
this.").
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examinations will constitute even greater state intrusion than occurred
under the old criminal law regime, a development which seems the
antithesis of the Lawrence Court's expansion of liberty.
I.

THE LAW OF LAWRENCE

In Lawrence v. Texas,9 the Supreme Court struck down a Texas
criminal statute that prohibited oral or anal sex between two persons
of the same sex. In so doing, the Court held that the liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause extends to adults "deciding how
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."1 0 Although
it requires some effort to articulate precisely what standard of review
the Court deployed in its analysis,11 there is no question that, whatever
test it used, the Court eradicated the last vestiges of state power to
criminalize private consensual adult sexual behavior solely on the
basis of morality, without any showing of harm either to persons or to
legally protected institutions.
To understand the extent to which the Court jettisoned morality
qua morality as a legitimate justification, one can compare the
decision in Lawrence to that of the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Wasson,12 which also invalidated a law, essentially
identical to the Texas statute, that prohibited sodomy only between
same-sex partners. Relying on state constitutional provisions
protecting liberty and equality, the Kentucky court did not bar
legislative reliance on morality as a justification for criminalization of
private adult consensual sexual conduct. Instead, the court held that a
moral justification could only be legitimate if the same standard
applied to all citizens, not just to lesbians and gay men.1 3 But the
Kentucky court did not question the legitimacy of a morality
justification for the prohibition of sodomy.
A holding such as that of the Kentucky court in Wasson
with its
deference to legislated morality so long as it was evenhanded - was
all that the Supreme Court in Lawrence had to adopt in order to strike
down the Texas law. It is telling that the majority specifically
-

9. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
10. Id. at 2480.
1 1. My view on this question is that a majority of the Court coalesced behind an
approach described most elaborately in Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752-89 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). See Nan D. Hunter, Living
with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1 103 (2004).
12. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
13. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 499-500. Of course, for equality protections to be meaningful,
even facially neutral statutes must be enforced and applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.
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eschewed this course.14 Instead, the Court rejected morality alone as a
sufficient ground for prohibiting consensual sexual conduct.
Other opinions in Lawrence also undercut the morality defense.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, which did rely on Equal
Protection grounds, rejected the most traditional use of morality
rationales by noting that laws embodying moral disapproval of a group
of persons could not pass a rational basis test.15 Even Justice Thomas's
terse dissent, with its characterization of sodomy prohibitions as
"uncommonly silly," suggested that he personally found the morality
arguments unpersuasive, even though he believed that the judiciary
was constrained not to second-guess a legislature's use of them.16
Thus, Lawrence proffers a critically important new principle:
untethered to some objective, material referent, morality alone cannot
justify deprivation of liberty. But exactly what this abstract declaration
will mean in practice is anything but clear.
Most of the impact of the now extinct sodomy laws had already
crossed the borders of criminal law prior to Lawrence. As the Court
noted, criminalization invites "discrimination both in the public and in
the private spheres."1 7 Prior to Lawrence, courts had routinely
accepted that invitation. Reasoning from the holding of Bowers v.
Hardwick,1 8 the judiciary developed what I have called the categorical
inequality principle, ruling that because gay people presumptively
violated criminal prohibitions against sodomy, the government could
properly deny them employment or custody or visitation rights with
their children.19
Categorical inequality based on sodomy laws has now ended.
Despite the Court's strong rhetoric of respect and dignity as to gay
lives, 2 0 however, the Lawrence opinion does not fully answer the
equality question of when and under what circumstances the law must,
to use Justice O'Connor's phrase, treat gay people "in the same
manner as everyone else."21
Instead, mixed in with the language of liberty, the Lawrence text
contains a series of verbal gestures toward possibilities of regulation.
In addition to a list of situations not covered by its holding,22 the Court
14. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
15. Id. at 2486.
16. Id. at 2498.
17. Id. at 2482.
18. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

.
19. Nan D. Hunter, Proportional Equality: Readings of Romer, 89 KY. L.J. 885, 893-95

(2000-01).
20. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478, 2482, 2484.
21. Id. at 2486.
22. The Lawrence Court stated:
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in Lawrence explicitly left open the question of whether same-sex
personal relationships are "entitled to formal recognition in the law."2 3
Consider the many aspects of family law, other than marriage, that
courts deliberating on whether to accord "formal recognition in the
law" to gay couples will have to address: eligibility for adoption,
taxability of assets and income, immigration status, standing to seek
redress for certain torts, entitlement to family leave and other
employment benefits, and many others. Is "recognition" a positive or
a negative liberty? If "formal recognition" entails some affirmative
extension of benefits, can we infer that the liberty right precludes the
imposition of penalties based on those relationships? If so, how does
one draw the line between benefits denied and penalties imposed? Is
there any disadvantage that the state can lawfully impose on non
commercial, consensual adult sexual conduct that occurs in private? 24
It is striking that in the first year after the Lawrence majority
authored the grand language of its opinion, appellate courts upheld
three forms of stark antigay discrimination. In Standhart v. Superior
Court of Maricopa County,25 the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that
the state could bar gay couples from marriage, on the ground that a
rational relationship existed between the legal definition of marriage
as limited to male-female unions and the state's legitimate interest in
"ensuring responsible procreation within committed, long-term
relationships."26 In State v. Limon,27 the Kansas Court of Appeals
upheld a seventeen-year sentence for an eighteen-year-old male who
engaged in oral sex with a fourteen-year-old male, despite the fact that
the maximum sentence would have been slightly more than one year
had one of them been female. In Lofton v. Secretary of Department of
Children and Family Services,28 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit upheld a Florida statute prohibiting gay people from
adopting children, on the ground that the legislature could rationally
decide that a policy favoring married couples and single heterosexuals
furthered the state's goal of promoting healthy sexual development in
children. Lawrence had surprisingly little impact on the outcome in

The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured
or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It
does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.

Id.

at 2484.
23.

Id. at 2478.

24.

See infra Part II.

25. 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct.
26.

App. 2003).

Standhart, 77 P.3d at 463.

27. 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct.

App. 2004).

28. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), reh'g

denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004).
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any of these decisions. Of the nine appellate judges who interpreted
in its first year, only one dissented from upholding these
statutes. 29
The importance of these particular rulings may fade with time;
future courts may reject any or all of them. What is important is not
what they stand for as propositions of law, but what they tell us about
the possible limits of Lawrence.30 Their significance lies in how they
exemplify the patterns and structure of the reasoning that courts may
use in a post-sodomy-law world.
One pattern that these early cases illustrate is that because the
concept of homosexuality as a benign variation has not yet achieved
widespread cultural acceptance, the question of whether
homosexuality actually causes harm in any given situation has no easy
resolution. Gay-rights advocates and opponents will have to offer
proof as to the existence of any asserted harms. 31 Courts will decide
fewer cases on motions to dismiss, and more litigation will involve
factual disputes, although often concerning evidence of societal
patterns as well as individualized situations. Contexts will vary widely,
from those involving young children in the care of gay people, to
anonymous or semi-anonymous sexual encounters, to individuals
seeking positions of significant power or public esteem. In each
context, courts will struggle with how to assess what role, if any,
homosexuality should play in the official policies of the state or in the
practices of private entities.
In the most significant victory for gay rights advocates since
Lawrence, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health struck down that state's ban on marriage
by same-sex couples. 3 2 The court's majority ruled that the exclusion
violates the state constitution as a matter of law.3 3 By contrast, two of
the three dissents relied heavily on social science evidence regarding
the effects on children of having been raised by same-sex partners, a
body of research which they found inconclusive in establishing the
absence of harm. 34
Lawrence

29. Judge Pierron of the Kansas Court of Appeals dissented in Limon. 83 P.3d at 243
(Pierron, J., dissenting).
30. Similarly, the earliest post-Brown decisions are now forgotten. But they foretold
subsequent flashpoints in the civil rights movement. See, e.g., Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp.
776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (interpreting Brown to mean that the Constitution "does not
require integration [of public schools) . . . . It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as
the result of voluntary action.").
31. Suzanne Goldberg characterizes this as the shift from philosophical to empirical
bases for morality arguments. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for
Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004).
32. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
33. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969.
34. Id. at 979-80, 998-99 & nn.23-27.
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This is not to suggest that an intense engagement with facts
operates to the disadvantage of equality advocates. In defending its
law, Massachusetts relied on essentially the same arguments and kinds
of proof as the state of Hawaii had used ten years earlier. On remand
from the Hawaii Supreme Court, which ruled that the state had to
demonstrate a compelling interest behind barring same-sex couples
from marriage,35 evidence at trial focused on child-rearing practices
and outcomes in gay families.36 The court ruled that the state had
failed to satisfy its burden of proof.37 With the debates over marriage
likely to be replicated for years in various venues, we can expect to see
such factual contests multiply. Indeed, with the elimination of morality
alone as an acceptable legislative goal, both advocates for and
opponents of marriage equality will intensify their focus on the
construction of facts.
The result may be, certainly should be, far more victories by
lesbian and gay litigants seeking equal rights and benefits in all these
realms. However, the result will not be expanded liberty in the sense
of less involvement by the state. The state, especially through its
judicial and social service arms, will be more, not less, involved with
the regulation of homosexuality. In each contested arena and even for
each barrier to equality that falls, new principles will emerge to govern
the relationship between the state and sexual orientation.
II.

THE PARADOX OF LAWRENCE

The hidden message of Lawrence is that, despite the Supreme
Court's proclamation of a zone of liberty "where the State should not
be a dominant presence,"38 the role of the state in regulating
homosexuality, both positively and negatively, will likely increase
rather than decrease. As the early cases discussed in the preceding
section indicate, assessing which state policies and private practices
concerning homosexuality are lawful will require more, not less,
judicial scrutiny. This new form of heightened scrutiny will entail more
precise and detailed judicial inquiries into whether such policies and
practices have legitimate justifications, beyond mere invocation of
moral conventions.
One important effect of the categorical inequality principle
characteristic of the Hardwick regime was that it eliminated the need

35. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In 1998, however, the Hawaii Constitution
was amended to empower the state legislature "to reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples." HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
36. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *4-18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
37. Id. at *21.
38. 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
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to delve into those questions. A belief that homosexuality was
properly subject to repression or de jure disadvantage reinforced the
ideology of heterosexuality as both the natural and the normative
ideal. Judicial reliance on categorical inequality precluded the
contestation of that ideology. The enforcement of categorical
inequality through the mechanism of highly deferential rational basis
review rendered the constitutional validity of heterosexual privilege
under law virtually inevitable.39 The absence of serious contestation
allowed the policy choices behind a matrix of heteronormative laws to
remain disguised as mere artifacts of natural law reasoning.
Lawrence is thus important less for its explicit protection of a
private sphere of intimate decisionmaking than for its implicit
unmasking of the interrelationship between sexuality and the state as
a properly public sphere. The Court's repudiation of a morality
justification was the rejection of assumed reasoning, of a rationale that
need not speak its name. The legitimacy of a basis in morality for
governmental efforts to control sexuality had been a given.4 0 Now
those who would use the state as a mechanism for privileging
heterosexuality must speak, and in some detail. The ensuing debate is
likely to reveal the gap between "merely exempt[ing] [homosexual
conduct] from criminal penalties" and "mak[ing] it 'lawful in the full
sense.' "41
The law of adultery provides a good comparison. Laws in twenty
four states prohibit adultery,42 an offense that did not exist at common
39. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th
Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329,
1356-58 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), vacated en bane, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court's decision in
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), mitigated this effect substantially, but not entirely. See
Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998) (distinguishing a Cincinnati charter amendment on the
ground that it did not affect statewide law and did not sweep as broadly as the Colorado
state constitutional amendment invalidated in Romer v. Evans); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d
1097, 1110 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1049 (1998) (distinguishing
denial of a job as assistant state attorney general to a lesbian attorney on the ground that
Romer v. Evans dealt with homosexuality as a status or condition, rather than conduct in
violation of state law).
40. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-27 (1968) (specific
federal policy limits state's power to discourage immorality); Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944,
949 (11th Cir. 2001).
41. JEFFREY WEEKS, SEX, POLITICS AND SOCIETY: THE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY
SINCE 1800, at 275 (1981).
42. See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1408-09 (West
2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-501 (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 798.01 (2003); GA.
CODE ANN.§ 16-6-19 (2003); IDAHO CODE§ 18-6601 (Michie 2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/11-7 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-3507 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., Criminal Law§ 10-501
(2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272,§ 14 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 750.29-.30 (1979); MINN.
STAT. § 609.36 (1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:3
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law but arose from the religious and moral beliefs of Europeans who
settled the American colonies.43 Virtually no prosecutions have
occurred for the last quarter century, except in cases also involving a
charge of rape.44 Moreover, the history of adultery law reveals that
non-prosecution is more than simply desuetude; a longstanding
ambivalence continues over whether adultery laws should police only
"open and notorious" conduct so as to prevent public scandal, but
overlook private infidelity.45
From the combination of repeal, inapplicability, and disuse,
criminal laws against adultery have essentially become a dead letter.
Thus, although one can argue about whether the Court's holding in
Lawrence requires invalidating them as a constitutional matter,
prohibitions of adultery have already become functionally irrelevant
as the basis for direct criminal prosecution. That does not mean,
however, that adultery has become "lawful in the full sense."46
Instead, legal regulation of adultery serves many of the same
functions that sodomy law has served: imposing penalties through the
operation of civil law, facilitating private discrimination, and
solidifying social and cultural norms. The state continues to regulate
adultery in a somewhat ad hoc fashion in multiple venues: through
employment law,47 family law,48 and tort law.49 In each zone, courts

(1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-184 (Michie
2003); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-09 (Michie 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 871
(West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-6-2 (Michie 2002); s.c. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60, -70
(Law. Co-op. 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (Michie
1996); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3 (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. § 944.16 (2002).
43. Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J.
FAM. L. 45, 47-49 (1991-92); Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A
History, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 210, 212-26 (1986).
44. There are only four reported cases in the last twenty-five years involving criminal
prosecutions for adultery, in which an allegation of rape was not involved. See State v.
Mangon, 603 So. 2d 1131 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357
(Mass. 1983); Van Norman v. State, 365 So. 2d 644 (Miss. 1978); Commonwealth v.
Papariella, 439 A.2d 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). Press reports exist of other cases. Note,
Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre- and Extramarital Sex, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1672 n.88 (1991); John F. Kelly, Va. Adultery Case Roils Divorce
Industry, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2003, at Bl. Nonetheless, overall direct enforcement appears
to be minimal, at least outside the military. See infra text accompanying notes 71-76.

45. See MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 150-53 (1951) (discussing Warner v.
State, 175 N.E. 661 (Ind. 1931), and State v. Chandler, 33 S.W. 797 (Mo. 1896)). Currently,
statutes in Alabama, Aorida, Illinois, North Carolina and Oklahoma require openness or
cohabitation. See statutes cited supra note 42.
46. Knuller, Ltd. v. Dir. of Public Prosecution, 1973 A.C. 435, 457 (1972) (upholding
conviction for conspiracy to corrupt public morals for publication of gay male personal ads).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 58-70.
48. See, e.g., Mabus v. Mabus, No. 2001-CA-00381-SCT, 2003 WL 327669 (Miss. Feb. 13,
2003); In re Blanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010 (N.H. 2003); R.G.M. v D.E.M., 410 S.E.2d 564
(S.C. 1991); Shackelford v. Shackelford, 571 S.E.2d 917 (Va. Ct. App. 2002). See generally
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have analyzed the functions served by various legal principles that
produce disadvantage for married persons who engage in sexual
relations with persons other than their spouses. Moral justifications
have sometimes figured in these decisions;50 Lawrence has rendered
those justifications insufficient standing alone. But morality accounts
for only some of a variety of rationales that courts have examined.
Consider the parallels to sodomy law, especially in the realm of the
workplace. When gay-rights advocates asserted that sodomy laws
indirectly created employment-law penalties, they often pointed to a
series of cases in which openly gay persons were denied jobs in some
aspect of law enforcement. In these cases, the state agencies argued,
and prevailed on, a theory that persons who admittedly violated the
state's sodomy law were not fit to be hired as police officers or state's
attorneys.51 Robin Shahar, for example, was denied employment as an
assistant state attorney general in Georgia on the ground that her
participation in a religious marriage ceremony marked her as someone
likely to engage in sodomy, then a crime in Georgia, and whose
presence would create credibility and public perception problems for
the Attorney General. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Attorney
General Michael Bowers was justified in rescinding her job offer on
those grounds.5 2 Ironically, it later came to light that Bowers himself
had been engaging in an adulterous relationship with a woman who
worked in his office at the time he refused to hire Shahar.53
Today, sodomy is no longer a crime in Georgia.54 Adultery,
however, remains illegal.55 If Bowers (who left office to run for
governor) were to apply for a job in his old office, would he be barred
from employment? If Shahar were to re-apply, would she finally get

JOHN C. MAYONE, BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS IN FAMILY LAW 8 (2d ed. 2003);
Note, supra note 44.
49. See, e.g., Bland v. Hill, 735 So. 2d 414 (Miss. 1999); Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8
(Utah 1991). See generally Note, supra note 44.
50. Linda Fitts Mischler, Personal Morals Masquerading as Professional Ethics:
Regulations Banning Sex Between Domestic Relations Attorneys and Their Clients, 23 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 23-25, 42-44 (2000).
51. Brief for Petitioners at 42-43, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No.
02-102).
52. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane), cen. denied, 522 U.S.
1049 (1998).
53. Kevin Sack, Georgia Candidate for Governor A dmits A dultery and Resigns
Commission in Guard, N.Y. nMES, June 6, 1997, at A29. The Eleventh Circuit refused to
supplement its record by either taking judicial notice of Bowers's admission or by permitting
further discovery, in part because "we cannot readily say that the result of the case probably
would be different." Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997).
54. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the sodomy statute violated the state
constitution's protection of privacy. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
55. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (2003).
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the job? The answers are not as clear as one might think. In an ironic
result of Lawrence, Bowers seems in the weaker position: unlike
Shahar, he has admitted to the commission of a crime.56
In contrast to the near absence of reported decisions in
prosecutions for adultery, a small but distinct body of jurisprudence
has arisen from analysis of the proper relationship between sexual
conduct outside marriage and fitness for public employment. Two U.S.
Court of Appeals rulings exemplify the uncertainty in this area. These
decisions, which concern actions taken fifteen years apart, hold that
government officials enjoy immunity from suits by public employees
on the ground that there is no clear answer to the question of whether
the state can regulate private, off-duty sexual behavior.57
Case law in the Sixth Circuit best illustrates the trajectory of the
public employment and adultery litigation. Prior to Bowers v.
Hardwick, the court upheld without opinion a district court decision
ruling that a police force could not fire a male officer for cohabiting
with a woman when both were married to someone else.58 Justice
White dissented from the denial of certiorari in the case, arguing that
the Supreme Court needed to determine the constitutionality of
restrictions on adult consensual sexual activity.59 Two years earlier,
dissenting from denial of review in a similar Fifth Circuit case, Justice
Brennan noted that "lower courts have divided sharply both in their
results. and in their analytic approach" to the question, which he
argued the Court should answer by recognizing a fundamental right.60
After Hardwick, courts in the Sixth Circuit relied on the
categorical-inequality principle to rule that no constitutional
protection attended an intimate adulterous relationship because such
intimacy cannot be said to be either "deeply rooted in the Nation's

56. Shahar, however, would not automatically be home free, since Bowers's theory of
his case in defending her firing was that her religious marriage ceremony signaled her
violation of Georgia's marriage statute as well as its sodomy law. See 114 F.3d at 1111
(Tjoflat, J., concurring).
57. Hughes v. City of N. Olmsted, 93 F.3d 238, 241-42 (6th Cir. 1996) (immunity from
liability for investigation of whether police officer had "open marriage"); Thorne v. City of
El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1138-40 (9th Cir. 1986) (immunity from liability for broad inquiry
into employee's off-duty sexual activities).
58. City of N. Muskegon v. Briggs, 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S.
909 (1985).
59. 473 U.S. at 909-10 (White, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). Justice White's
recognition that the law was unsettled as to the permissibility of criminal prohibitions on
consensual adult heterosexual conduct makes his decision in Bowers v. Hardwick even
stranger. Because the Georgia statute at issue there applied to heterosexual as well as
homosexual acts, White had the opportunity that he had sought a year earlier to clarify the
law. Instead, his opinion reads as an anti-gay polemic.
60. Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 965-66, 971-72 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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history and tradition or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."61
One judge, however, argued that the court should examine the facts of
any given case in light of the factors the Supreme Court identified in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees62 as indicative of an intimate
association entitled to constitutional protection.63 Those factors
include depth of emotional attachment, degree of commitment,
selectivity, and the sharing of "distinctively personal aspects of one's
life."64 Judge Clay's concurrence provides a good example of the
alternate meaning of heightened scrutiny that I am using: in the
process of applying a more stringent standard of review which
accorded more respect to the plaintiff's adulterous relationship than
the majority's use of a per se rule, he subjected the relationship to a
detailed factual examination, eventually concluding that it lacked the
indicia of intimacy that the Supreme Court had identified in Roberts.65
One result of Lawrence may be more viable claims of intimate
association rights by same-sex couples, leading to the same degree of
judicial inquiry.
The adultery and public employment cases demonstrate that the
question of allowable penalty in such cases remains complex. In some
cases, the public knew of the employee's conduct, raising the question
of whether it adversely affected the standing of the law-enforcement
agency with the public.66 Cases also vary as to whether the adulterous
relationship involved a co-worker67 or the spouse of a co-worker.68 In
other cases, the relationship concerned persons who had come to the
attention of the law-enforcement agency because of some link to other
criminal activity.69 The presence or absence of a criminal prohibition

61. Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Mercure v. Van
Buren Township, 81 F. Supp. 2d 814 (E.D. Mich. 2000). Courts outside the Sixth Circuit also
relied on Hardwick's categorical reasoning. Oliverson v. W. Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465,
1482-83 (D. Utah 1995); City of Sherman v. H enry, 928 S.W.2d 464, 470-72 (Tex. 1996).
62. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
63. 308 F.3d at 643-46 (Clay, J., concurring).
64. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20; Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'! v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537,
546 (1987).
65. 308 F.3d at 645-46.
66. Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va. 1982); Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp.
555 (M.D.N.C. 1978); Cook v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 420 S.E.2d
847 (S.C. 1992); see also Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (librarians).
67. Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. San Jacinto Junior Coll.,
498 F. Supp. 555 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Wilson, 463 F. Supp. 555 (M.D.N.C. 1978).
68. City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1996).
69. Baron v. Meloni, 556 F. Supp. 796 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
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per se cannot resolve any of the workplace-management problems
that these scenarios raise.70
Federal law governing members of the armed services has codified
these considerations into a set of provisions that function as one
integrated combination of criminal law and employment code. Articles
133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice permit
prosecutions for adultery71 as constituting either "conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman"72 or an action that is "to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces" or "of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces."73 By Executive Order in 2002,
however, President Bush sharply curtailed the effective reach of the
U.C.M.J. The Bush Executive Order revised the Manual for Courts
Martial to define prejudice to good order as "conduct that has an
obvious, and measurably divisive effect on unit or organization
discipline, morale or cohesion, or is clearly detrimental to the
authority or stature of or respect toward a servicemember."74 It further
limited service-discrediting conduct to that which was "open and
notorious."75 In addition, the Order specified factors that military
authorities must consider before initiating a court martial, including
the respective ranks of the "accused" and the "co-actor," the
connection, if any, between the spouse(s) and the military, the impact
on any member's own job performance, and any misuse of
"government time and resources to facilitate the commission of the
conduct."76
The law of adultery and public employment offers a preview of the
kinds of inquiries that are likely to arise in judicial scrutiny of
homosexuality and employment after Lawrence. With the decisive
effect of criminalization removed, courts will have to ask more, not
fewer, questions about the nexus between the sexual activity at issue
and the workplace. One could even imagine the open and notorious
70. Some cases arose in jurisdictions without a criminal prohibition of adultery.
Hollenbaugh, 439 U.S. at 1057 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Marcum v.
McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 2002).
71. C. Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters But Should Marriage?: Adultery, Fratenerization,
and Honor in the Military, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 177, 213-34 (1999); see, e.g., United States
v. Kroop, 38 M.J. 470 (C.M.A. 1993); United States v. Frazier, 34 M.J. 194 (C.M.A. 1992).
72. 10 u.s.c. § 933 (2000).
73. 10 u.s.c. § 934 (2000).
74. Exec. Order No. 13262, 3 C.F.R. 210 (2003), (amending Exec. Order No. 12473, 3
C.F.R. 201 (1985)). The Executive Order partially implements one of the recommendations
of a panel sponsored by the National Institute for Military Justice, which recommended full
decriminalization of both adultery and sodomy. Report of the Commission on the 50th
Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (May 2001), at
www.badc.orglhtml/militarylaw_cox.html.
75. 3 C.F.R. at 217.
76. Id.
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standard from the Bush Executive Order on adultery replacing the
military's Don't Ask Don't Tell policy.
Just as civil penalties for sexual harassment have led to the
generation of hundreds of judicial narratives about the details of
sexual interactions in the workforce, the need to regulate how
employers can or cannot take sexual orientation into consideration
will intensify the law's discourse on homosexuality. Indeed, with the
Supreme Court's ruling that same-sex sexual harassment can be
actionable if the discriminatory conduct occurred because of the sex of
the person harassed,77 the process of examining harassment with
homosexual overtones has already begun. In its opinion, the Court
was careful to specify an exemption for "intersexual flirtation" from
the zone of objectionable activity,78 leaving lower courts to infer that
same-sex flirtation might be judged differently. One court has noted
that it "cannot rule out that the homosexual aspect of harassment
could objectively contribute [to] a hostile environment."79
Ill.

CONTAINMENT AND COMPLEXITY

As is true in both the adultery employment law cases and the
earliest round of post-Lawrence sexual orientation cases, courts
provide a central institutional venue for negotiating the role of
sexuality in the public sphere. Even the autonomy claims specifically
denominated as privacy and associated with contraception and
abortion always spilled outside the private sphere. Efforts to establish
the public presence of birth control clinics, not any real threat of
police in the bedroom, triggered the series of lawsuits eventually
resulting in Griswold v. Connecticut and the Supreme Court's
recognition of privacy as a component of substantive due process.8 0
Lawrence secures the right to seclusion and shelter for sexual
intimacy, but its impact on full sexual autonomy beyond the operation
of criminal law is much less clear.
The question of social legitimacy marks the cultural fault line for
homosexuality, the point at which political eruptions occur. Given the
intensity of debates over such issues as marriage, it seems unlikely that
genuine, consistent moral neutrality will characterize social and legal
77. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
78. Id. at 81.
79. Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 712-13 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
80. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). All of the Connecticut litigation grew from the closure of birth
control clinics in 1940. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY & SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE v. WADE 60-72 (1994). Two federal court challenges
prior to Griswold were dismissed on standing and ripeness grounds: Tileston v. Ullman, 318
U.S. 44 (1943), and Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). For an early (and critical)
observation of the problems with the term "privacy, " see Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain
Protection ofPrivacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173.
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practices related to homosexuality in the near future. Rather, deprived
of criminal law as a tool, opponents of equality for lesbians and gay
men are likely to concentrate increasingly on the strategy of
containment.
The effort to contain homosexuality and even an explicit
comparison to communicable disease is not new; even before AIDS,
the metaphor of disease was used to defend sodomy laws.81
Containment now buttresses a kinder, gentler hierarchy, but one that
courts nonetheless continuously modernize by refining the rationales
for antigay bigotry.82 Much of the current debate about homosexuality
appears grounded in beliefs in fair treatment for lesbian and gay
Americans that co-exist with beliefs in the superiority of
heterosexuality.83 In this atmosphere, public policy disputes are likely
to center on the proper degree of containment necessary for what is
perceived to be the homosexual menace to public culture. Drawing on
archetypes of danger long associated with homosexuality,84 three
themes or discursive fields are likely to emerge as the primary arenas
for regulation and scrutiny: situation-specific disputes involving
children or the control of expressive space; the rank ordering of same
sex relationships into legal hierarchies; and containment by analogy.
A.

Situation-Specific Containment
1.

Lofton

v.

Secretary

Children

of Department of Children

and

Family

Services85

and State v. Limon86 both illustrate the power of
containment arguments in contexts involving children. Both cases
reflect the mixture of pre- and post-Lawrence paradigms at work in
81. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.).

82. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE
LAW 1177-78 (2d ed. 2004); William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation
of Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327
(2000).
83. Charles Lane, Polls: Americans Say Court Is "About Right," WASH. POST, July 7,
2003, at A15; James Ricci & Patricia Ward Bierderman, Acceptance of Gays on Rise, Polls
Show, L.A. nMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at Bl; Katharine Q. Seelye & Janet Elder, Strong Support
is Found for Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. nMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at Al.
84. Larry Cata Backer has described how decades of case law prior to Lawrence helped
to construct the image of gay men as seducers of youth, sexually promiscuous, defilers of
public space, and predators. Larry Cata Backer, Constructing a "Homosexual" for
Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in United States and
British Courts, 71 TUL. L. REV. 529 (1996); see also Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as
Contagion: From The Well of Loneliness to the Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401 (2000)
(tracing the history of the contagion and identity models of homosexuality).
85. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
86. 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
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particularly vivid ways, because both were structured and litigated at
the trial court level and through initial appeals prior to the Court's
decision in Lawrence. Limon was pending before the Supreme Court
on a petition for certiorari when Lawrence was decided; the Court
remanded so that the Kansas Court of Appeals could reconsider its
earlier decision upholding differential sentencing in light of
Lawrence. s7 The Eleventh Circuit heard oral argument in Lofton
before the Lawrence opinion issued, and received supplemental briefs
from the parties afterward.ss Thus, in both cases, the parties and the
court had to adjust when Bowers v. Hardwick was overruled.
Limon involved consensual oral sex between two males, fourteen
and eighteen-years-old, both residents in a facility for the
developmentally disabled. Kansas criminalized same-sex sodomy at
the time, but, in this instance, had one participant been female, there
still would have been a prosecutable offense, because the law
presumed the fourteen-year-old could not consent. The statute
governing sentencing created a special category, however, when two
opposite-sex participants were less than four years apart in age. Under
that statute, Matthew Limon would have received a sentence of
thirteen to fifteen months in prison had the other party been female.
Instead, because the "Romeo and Juliet" provision explicitly excluded
same-sex partners, he received a sentence of seventeen years and two
months.s9
The Lofton plaintiffs challenged a Florida statute that prohibited
adoption by persons "known to engage in current, voluntary
homosexual activity," then illegal under that state's sodomy law.90
Florida allowed both married couples and single heterosexuals to
adopt children.91 The plaintiffs included gay foster parents and legal
guardians who sought to adopt the children for whom they had been
caring.92
Prior to Lawrence, attorneys for Kansas had defended its statute
by arguing the categorical principle of Hardwick: if the state could
constitutionally criminalize homosexual sexual behavior, it could also
impose differential punishment upon persons who engaged in that
behavior.93 Attorneys for Florida had invoked morality as a rational

87. Limon v. Kansas, 123 S. Ct. 2638 (2003).
88. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809.
89. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
90. The statute states, "No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that
person is a homosexual." FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (2003). Courts subsequently developed
the definition of "homosexual." See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807.
91.

FLA. STAT.

ch. 63.042(2)(a)-(b) (2003).

92. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807-08.
93. Limon, 83 P.3d at 244 (Pierron, J., dissenting).
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basis for differential treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.94
Despite Lawrence, neither state relinquished a morality claim,95 and
both courts accepted the goal of shielding children from exposure to
homosexuality as a legitimate substitute for the morality argument
rejected in Lawrence.
The Eleventh Circuit buried the state's earlier justification of
morality in a footnote as if it had never been significant,96 and found
that the state could rationally conclude that the "presence of both
male and female authority figures [was] critical to optimal childhood
development and socialization."97 As the reason for why that
statement would be true, the court stated that "heterosexual singles,
even if they never marry, are better positioned than homosexual
individuals to provide adopted children with education and guidance
relative to their sexual development throughout pubescence and
adolescence."98 On this reasoning, homosexuality intrinsically presents
possible harm to children, and the state in exercise of its solemn duty
to protect children in its care, can act to prevent that harm from
occurring.
On a six to six vote, the Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing en
banc.99 Dissenting from that order, Judge Barkett argued that the
court should not assume that such harm would occur, and complained
that "the panel never explains why it is rational to believe that
homosexuals, as a class, are unable to provide stable homes and
appropriate role models for children."100 Judge Birch, in his special
concurrence, sought to answer: "[T]he mainstream of contemporary
American family life consists of heterosexual individuals. Can it
seriously be contended that an arguably rational basis does not exist
for placing adoptive children in the mainstream of American family
life?"101 Judge Birch's response still fails to furnish an explanation, but
as the exchange framed here by Judges Barkett and Birch continues,
either in this case or in future cases, the arguments are likely to grow
more specific.
94. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 1372, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Brief of Appellees at
41-47, Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.
2004) (No. 01-16723).
95. Appellee's Brief on Rehearing at 15-20, State v. Limon, 32 Kan. App. 2d 369
(2004) (No. 00-85898-A); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs. , 358 F.3d
at 819 n.17; Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1278
(11th Cir. 2004) (en bane).
96. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819 n.17.
97. Id. at 818.
98. Id. at 822.
99. 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004).
100. 377 F.3d at 1298.
101. Id. at 1276.
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In Limon, containment functioned as the basis for upholding the
sentencing differential, literally for the justice who wrote the primary
opinion and metaphorically for the concurring justice. Justice Green,
writing for the court, is a Lawrence resister: he refuses to surrender
morality as a basis for imprisonment. Among the variety of rationales
he offered to explain why the legislature would impose such a
draconian differential, Justice Green included "to prevent the gradual
deterioration of the sexual morality approved by a majority of
Kansans."102 Justice Malone, concurring, demurred from following that
path, but accepted that it would be reasonable for the legislature to
protect children from the "increased health risks associated with
homosexual activity until they are old enough to be more certain of
their choice."103 Remarkably, he found this reason persuasive despite
his acknowledgment that no increased health risks ensue when the
participants in a homosexual act are female.104
We expect adults to protect themselves from pernicious influences
and obvious dangers, but society steps in to protect children when
necessary. Both Lofton and Limon involved minors in the custody of
the state, eliminating any potential conflict between state and parent.
Even before Lawrence, an overwhelming shift in family law had
resulted in the protection of the custody and visitation rights of gay
parents and even the institutionalization of two-parent adoption by
gay couples. In jurisdictions where that has not occurred, however, the
future battles will center on arguments of containment in the form of
protecting children from the harmful effects of exposure to
homosexuality.
2.

Expressive Space

Geography created an important limiting principle in Lawrence by
specifying a key spatial dimension - private space - to the liberty
being protected.1 05 The opposite spatial dimension - public space,
with its openness to representation and advocacy - presents a
different critical question for the law: to what extent, if any, can the
state regulate public culture, where exposure to homosexuality is most
likely and thus containment arguably most urgently needed?
Sexual speech of any sort has led to the First Amendment anomaly
of courts according public speech less protection than private speech,
and allowing the government to zone explicit representation into

102 Limon, 83 P.3d at 236.
103. Id. at 242 (Malone, J., concurring).
104. Id.

105. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
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certain locations and out of others.106 So we begin from the proposition
that sexual speech is different from and less valued under the law than
other speech. Will homosexual sexual speech be more different still,
accorded less protection than heterosexual sexual speech? And could
that possibly be true now, even if such a differential was permissible
prior to Lawrence? Put another way, if homosexual conduct is legal,
how could homosexual speech be penalized?107
Some limits on when gay speech can be suppressed are clear. At
least the second half of "don't ask, don't tell" used to be the cultural
norm, but is no longer; media representations of homosexuality and
out gay people are comrnonplace.108 A partial exception to this persists
in schools, where the degree of openness is largely left to
administrative discretion, 109 and in electronic and interactive media,
where courts await maturation of filtering and other technologies that
facilitate parental control.110
Propositioning an adult of the same sex in a public space to engage
in conduct in a private space ought to be insulated from prosecution
because it is a solicitation to commit a lawful act. However, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal stated in 1995 in a case involving
two men that solicitation even for private lawful conduct could be
prosecuted: "the solicitation of some sexual acts is simply not
appropriate in public places. To suggest that government cannot
prohibit such solicitation is unfathomable."111 No Oklahoma court has
yet ruled on whether this dicta will survive Lawrence, but the court's
reasoning indicates that the distinction between public and private
space remains a viable one in First Amendment jurisprudence on
sexual speech.
Insofar as explicit representation is concerned, the law is
thoroughly muddled and likely to remain so. In this area, the law, like
the imagery, is unruly; cases involve varying degrees of erotic content,

106. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
107. I do not address issues related to the military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, which
is now more vulnerable under a First Amendment analysis.
108. See generally SUZANNA DANUTA WALTERS,
VISIBILITY IN AMERICA (2001).

ALL THE RAGE: THE STORY OF GAY

109. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en
bane) (upholding transfer of teaching for violating policy against presenting "controversial
materials" to students); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir.
1995) (finding that mandatory AIDS awareness assembly did not create hostile
environment).
110. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004) (affirming injunction against federal
Child Online Protection Act); United States v. American Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297
(2003) (upholding requirement that public library install filters on computers in order to
qualify for federal funds).
111. Sawatzky v. City of Oklahoma City, 906 P.2d 785, 787 n.7 (1995).

June 2004]

Sexual Orientation and Heightened Scrutiny

1547

in contexts ranging from health education1 12 to high art113 to unadorned
commerce. At least as a matter of law, the elimination of sodomy
statutes will not change much, and Lawrence is unlikely to prevent
wide discrepancies in the law affecting containment of homosexual
imagery in public space.
Most public space containment cases still involve an older
discursive theme of the uniquely offensive character of homosexual
expression, but a more modern theme also exists, that of suppressing
gay speech to prevent disruption or even violence. The military's don't
ask, don't tell policy is founded on this argument, expressed as the unit
cohesion rationale,114 and examples of it exist outside that institution
as well.115
B.

Containment by Hierarchy

The rhetoric of respect for gay relationships in Lawrence,
combined with a myriad of other forms of legal recognition for same
sex couples, signals that the period when such couples were treated as
strangers under the law is over. Even states with sodomy laws that
were in effect up until the Court's decision in Lawrence contained
municipalities that recognized gay couples for some purposes.116
Indeed, current debate over relationships centers on what, until

112. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995); Gay Men's
Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (invalidating CDC policies
regarding AIDS educational materials as contrary to statutory standard and void for
vagueness); Rees v. State, 909 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding obscenity
conviction for showing film of sex acts between men on public access cable sex information
program).
113. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding
statutory requirement that NEA consider "general standards of decency" in making grant
awards).
1 14. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 929-30 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane).
115. The same rationale of treating men's sexual solicitation of other men as
constituting provocation of violence lay behind acceptance of the "gay panic" defense. See
Joshua Dressler, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on
Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 726, 754-56 (1995); Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Note, Provocation's Privileged
Desire: The Provocation Doctrine, "Homosexual Panic, " and the Non-Violent Unwanted
Sexual Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 195 (2000). Ohio recently reversed
case law in which same-sex solicitation was criminalized under a "fighting words" rationale,
on the theory that a person might respond to such a solicitation with violence. State v.
Thompson, 767 N.E.2d 251 (Ohio 2002).
1 16. Local jurisdictions in Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina and Texas offered
domestic partner health benefits to lesbian and gay public employees at the time that
Lawrence was decided. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, THE STATE OF THE
WORKPLACE FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 2002, at 13
tbl. 3 (2002), available at http://www.hrc.org. Each of those states had a sodomy statute
which was invalidated by the Court's decision. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 82, at
76-78.
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recently, seemed the radical question of whether laws limiting
marriage to heterosexuals can be justified.
As an institution, however, marriage stands for nothing if not
containment, and specifically containment of sexuality. On that point,
both the majority and the dissent in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health,117 for example, agree. The majority opinion essentially
substitutes the exclusive commitment of monogamy for the different
sexes of the partners as the very definition of marriage, repeatedly
drawing on exclusivity as the sine qua non of marriage.U8 Justice
Cordy in dissent accepted that principle, although he put it to different
use: "[p]aramount among its many important functions, the institution
of marriage has systematically provided for the regulation of
heterosexual behavior [and) brought order to the resulting
procreation . . . . The partners in a marriage are expected to engage in
exclusive sexual relations, with children the probable result and
paternity presumed."1 19
If Justice Scalia saw with horror an openness to same-sex marriage
creeping into the logic of the Kennedy and O'Connor opinions in
Lawrence, despite the implicit or explicit disavowals of both authors, 120
others view the prospect of marital structures for same-sex
relationships with alarm for very different reasons. From the
perspective of queer legal theory, Lawrence provides both an overdue
correction and a new set of problems. To achieve the correction, the
Court performed the regulatory function that Gayle Rubin identified
more than twenty years ago: the Justices drew the line of social
acceptance at a new point in the hierarchy of sexual identities,
accepting the most conventional same-sex couples into the realm of
"respect," but potentially further isolating those whose lives place
them in the regions of disrepute on the wrong side of the line.121 Or, to
translate into my model, the Court tore down an old wall of
containment and built a new one.

117. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
118. Id. at 961 ("[I]t is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage
partners to one another . . . that is the sine qua non of civil marriage."); id. at 969 ("We
construe civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the
exclusion of all others."); id. at 948-49 (defining marriage as "[t]he exclusive commitment of
two individuals to each other" and an "intimate, exclusive union"); id. at 965 (noting
"marriage's solemn obligation[] of exclusivity"); id. at 969 (maintaining that "the aim of
marriage [is] to promote stable, exclusive relationships").
119. Id. at 995.
120. 123 S. Ct. at 2478 ("whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law"); see
also id. at 2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that legitimate state interests would
include "preserving the traditional institution of marriage").
121. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,
in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 282 (Carole S. Vance
ed., 1984).
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Professors Kendall Thomas122 and Teemu Ruskola1 23 adopt Janet
Halley's critique of the Hardwick opinion as equally applicable to
Lawrence: "heterosexual identity is the location from which the
Justices decide the case without appearing to."124 Both argue that the
Court's language seeks to subsume gay sex into the norms of
domestication associated with marriage, as in the Court's statement
that "[t]o say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward,
just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse."125 The question this
portion of the opinion leaves begging is whether private consensual
sexual acts should be protected, independently of relationships. As
Ruskola notes, "sex need not be about connection at all; sex can
signify intense alienation and separation as much as connection."126
The re-mapping of sexual respectability evident in the text of
Lawrence creates the third major site for contests over containment.
Lawrence skirts this issue. The ambiguity of the Court's meaning is
reflected in its statement that "intimate conduct with another
person . . . can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring."1 27 Queer theorists fear that this statement will be read with
particular emphasis, as meaning that intimate conduct with another
person can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. Their concern is that long-term commitment will become a
prerequisite in future judicial interpretations of the scope of liberty
that Lawrence recognizes.
Whether their language was euphemistic or precise, past Justices
have framed sexual rights in relational terms. All told, prior to
Lawrence, three Justices of the Supreme Court wrote opinions arguing
that private adult consensual conduct should be treated as a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. The earliest, Justice
Marshall's, concerned a heterosexual couple fired from their jobs in a
public library because of their open cohabitation.128 Justice Marshall

122. Kendall Thomas, Our Brown? Reading Lawrence
manuscript).

v.

Texas (unpublished

123. Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights vs. Queer Theory: What Is Left of Sodomy After
Lawrence v. Texas (March 27, 2004) (unpublished manuscript).
124. Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1767 (1993). Katherine Franke critiques the case on similar
grounds. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1399 (2004).
125. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
126. Ruskola, supra note 123, at 17.
127. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
128. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (Marshall,
dissenting from denial of cert.).

J.,
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framed the issue as their "rights to pursue an open rather than a
clandestine personal relationship" and their "choice of living
arrangements for themselves and their child."129 Justice Brennan, also
addressing two heterosexual public employees fired because of their
relationship, framed the fundamental right as encompassing "a broad
range of private choices involving family life and personal
autonomy."130 Lastly, Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick spoke of "the fundamental interest all individuals have in
controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others,"131
associations that "form so central a part of an individual's life."132
However, the Court in Lawrence cited none of these opinions.
Nowhere in the record before the Court was there any indication
that the parties in Lawrence had "an enduring personal bond. "133
There was thus no basis for the Court to condition the full protection
of liberty on the existence of such a relationship. My contention,
therefore, is that the sentence will be read with a different emphasis,
as meaning that intimate conduct can be but one element in a personal
bond . . . or not; there is no necessary connection between the two. On
this reading, the liberty protection attaches to the intimate conduct in
a way that covers all that Lawrence purports to protect: consensual,
non-commercial, adult sexual conduct occurring in physically
sequestered locations. Moreover, this reading is consistent with the
Court's declaration that "it is the right of the individual, married or
single" to choose to engage in heterosexual conduct without fear of

129. Id. at 1055-56.
130. Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 971 (1983) (Brennan,
denial of cert.).

J.,

dissenting from

131. 478 U.S. at 206.
132. Id. at 204.
133. Because Lawrence and Garner entered pleas of nolo contender, the record from
the lower courts contained no description of the circumstances of their encounter. Lawrence
v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001) (en bane). The silence of the record has not
impeded the commentary, however. Larry Tribe notes that "[a]pparently, [the relationship
between Lawrence and Garner] was quite fleeting, lasting only one night and lacking any
semblance of permanence or exclusivity." Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
"Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1904 (2004).
Tribe reads Lawrence
and the "but one element" sentence specifically - as founded on a
recognition of the value of relationships and a presumption against allowing governmental
intrusion into deeply personal connections, a presumption that he describes the Court as
"unflinchingly applying . . . despite the seemingly casual character of the encounter
involved," because to have done otherwise would have "ceded to the state the power to
determine what count as meaningful relationships." Id. at 1905. In a diametrically opposite
reading of that same sentence, Katherine Franke asserts that "the Court took it as a given
that Lawrence and Garner were in a relationship, and the fact of that relationship does
important normative work in the opinion," i.e., "thorough[ly] . . . domesticating John
Lawrence and Tyron Garner." Franke, supra note 124, at 1408. My own understanding of
the facts, based on hearsay, is the same as Tribe's.
-
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pregnancy.134 Any further hierarchic ranking within the category of
sexual conduct would raise suspicions of morals-driven selection
criteria. Morally neutral considerations - such as the impact of
certain couples in a particular workplace - might legitimately lead to
regulatory interventions. If that assessment is to be genuinely neutral,
however, couplehood will not be a precondition for protection of
liberty.
C.

Containment by Analogy

Despite the significant body of law which has arisen addressing the
relationship between sexuality and the state, a conceptual muddiness
remains at the core of our understanding of that relationship. Law
operates by analogy, and a multi-faceted analogy problem bedevils the
law of sexuality.
Sodomy law sought to regulate both acts and identities. In
Hardwick, the Court had before it a statute which prohibited acts, by
whomever committed, but the Court's opinion created a judicial test
which focused on identities.U5 In Lawrence, the Court created a test
which integrated the two, while also recognizing the ways in which the
target for direct legal control had shifted over time from acts to
identities, leading to a confusion between the two.136 Even as the
Court made its integrative move, however, the confines of legal
doctrine forced it to choose between the two doctrinal handles
presented by the petitioners - due process and equal protection - to
provide the basis for its decision.137 Thus, one central analogic problem
is whether principles of liberty or equality most closely fit the question
of how law should conceptualize the rights of lesbians and gay men.
Within the equality framework, the second question of analogy
becomes how to compare classifications based on sexual orientation to
other group-based classifications. Disputes over race generated the
Fourteenth Amendment and continue to serve as the central paradigm
for all equal protection questions. Whether or to what extent sexual
orientation can be compared to race has produced its own body of
academic commentary,138 now joined by debates over whether sex139 or

134. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
135. 478 U.S. at 188 n.1, 192, 196.
136. 123 S. Ct. at 2478-80.
137. See id. at 2482.
138. See, e.g. , Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of
Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115 (David Kairys
ed., 3d ed. 1998); Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 1467 (2000); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?: Race,
Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358 (2000); Sharon
Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies - Identity and "Passing": Race and Sexual
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religion140 might furnish a closer comparison to sexual orientation.
That debate has not reached the Supreme Court, however. The Court
has assiduously avoided the question of classification analogy, opting
instead for the default mechanism of rational basis review,
supplemented by a higher standard for rationality, for sexual
orientation classifications, as was evident in Romer v. Evans, now
clarified by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence.141
Nor do liberty and equality exhaust the field of doctrinal
possibilities. To a much greater extent than in prior civil rights
movements, expression and voice form a key component of gay rights
struggles. Coming out creates the stigmatized identity. Thus the
doctrinal basis for the protection of coming-out speech - the First
Amendment - plays a fundamental role in questions of either
autonomy or equality for gay people.142
Lawrence offers no guidance on any of these aspects of analogy
appropriateness and appropriation. Perhaps over time, one of the
foregoing themes or doctrines will come to dominate in the law of
sexual orientation. In the meantime, analogic confusion is likely to
continue.
There is a bright side to the analogy problem, however: uncertainty
can operate as positive openness and not merely as avoidance.
Declining to specify an analogy for sexual orientation carries the
political advantage of judicial minimalism, postponing closure on a
divisive social issue until the political branches are more uniformly

Orientation, 13 HARV. BLACKLETIER L.J. 65 (1997); Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay
and Bisexual Rights and " The Civil Rights Agenda," 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 33 (1994).

139. A number of articles examine the analogy between sex and sexual orientation
discrimination, but most of the arguments are captured by a recent exchange: Edward Stein,
Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV.
471 (2001) and Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for
Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).
In the Texas state courts, Lawrence and Garner relied on the state's Equal Rights
Amendment to argue that because the sodomy statute criminalized certain conduct only if
the two persons were of the same sex, proof of defendants' sex was a necessary element of
the crime, an example of per se discrimination. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.
2001) (en bane). In the Supreme Court, counsel for the two men elected to forego the sex
discrimination argument entirely, although it could have been used as an alternative basis for
arguing a violation of the federal Equal Protection Clause. See Brief for Petitioners,
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102). Bypassing sex discrimination
allowed the attorneys to avoid a line of argument that would have been far more difficult to
distinguish from challenges to marriage statutes, since all exclusionary marriage laws utilize
the same distinction based on sex of partners that the Texas sodomy law embodied.
140. The most forceful argument that religion furnishes the closest comparison to sexual
orientation is DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: RACE,
GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES (1999).
141. 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 82, at 321-70; Nan D. Hunter, Expressive
Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2000).
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aligned on the illegitimacy of antigay bias. Moreover, although the
logic of legal argument will press both advocates and courts to identify
and elaborate analogy more clearly, not pinning down the closest
comparison may prove the most liberating move in the long run, as
well as a politically pragmatic move in the short run.
There is no intrinsic, ahistorical best doctrine for sexual
orientation. Of course, "best" could be defined as most powerful in
ending oppression or as least disruptive of the social order or in any
number of other ways. But even if one accepts that "best" should
mean most efficacious in equalizing the power relationship between
the majority and the socially subordinate group, there is no always
right answer. Many women's rights advocates chafed at the language
in Roe v. Wade which grounded the right to choose abortion as much
with the physician as with the pregnant woman, and it became a
common argument that the decision would have been far more
powerful had it been based on sex equality, rather than due process
privacy, grounds.143 Ironically, however, in Lawrence v. Texas, most
observers have understood the equal protection claim to be weaker
than the due process claim. 144 Had winning on due process not
necessarily entailed the reversal of Hardwick, however, the opposite
perception of Lawrence might well have dominated.
With the onus of Hardwick removed, one can at least imagine
examinations of the regulation of homosexuality that could step
beyond the group-based focus and substitute a model of analysis built
on the understanding that classifications emerge from structures and
systems of subordination. A shortcoming of analogy disputes is that
they tend to produce simplistic models of hierarchy. In the field of sex
discrimination, for example, courts have framed the question of
whether a practice discriminates based on sex as synonymous with the
question of whether it discriminates against women, or perhaps
against men.145 Framing the question in that way, rather than as a
broader interrogation of gender, precludes the strongest modes of
anti-subordination argument.
Using a focus on structures of subordination would direct attention
to a broad range of ideologies of superiority, prevailing cultural and
social norms, and material consequences of oppressive practices. An

143. See, e.g. , Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1621-45 (1979).
144. See Tribe, supra note 133, at 1907-16.
145. The lower court in Lawrence used this argument as part of the basis for its ruling
that the Texas Equal Rights Amendment did not apply. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349,
359 (finding that the sodomy law produced no "disparate impact between men and
women").
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expansive notion of full citizenship turns on freedom from all such
systems of social control.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lawrence v. Texas marked a dramatic milestone in efforts to limit
state power to control homosexuality, but the product is likely to be a
different regulatory regime rather than a libertarian utopia (or
dystopia, depending on one's perspective). Law long ago ceased to be
effective in prohibiting consensual conduct, and has instead functioned
as a critically important venue for multiplying the discourses of
sexuality. Under the regime of Lawrence, courts will continue to
operate as mediating institutions, adjudicating the contest between
equality demands and efforts at containment.

